Page 2543 - Week 07 - Thursday, 18 June 2009
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during an emergency animal disease outbreak. In an emergency situation it is imperative that confusion is minimised and a consistent approach taken across all jurisdictions. Amending the title will assure our interstate counterparts that they are dealing with the appropriate person during any disease incursion.
A similarly important clarification contained in the bill confers the ability for the chief executive to appoint appropriate public servants from other jurisdictions with responsibility for administering similar legislation to the Animal Diseases Act. The bill also confers the ability for the Chief Veterinary Officer to delegate his powers to such public servants from other jurisdictions. Presently, the phrase “public servant” is defined under the Legislation Act 2001 to mean an ACT public servant. This definition affects all ACT legislation. Therefore, this definition works to prevent any public servant from the commonwealth or another state or territory being authorised or delegated powers under the act.
The ACT has appropriate officers within its workforce to manage all day-to-day operations and, indeed, for handling most lockdowns or quarantines. However, it does not take blind Freddy to see that, in an extraordinary emergency situation, having access to additional qualified resources from other jurisdictions may ameliorate the situation. Should a serious animal disease outbreak occur in the territory, it may be necessary to call on our interstate counterparts to help combat the disease, just as we would lend a helping hand to them should they request it. It is vital at such times of emergency that we have access to as many people of skill as is required to eradicate the incursion. This is not unique to animal disease management; there are already similar provisions in the Gene Technology Act. The Emergencies Act also provides a mechanism to allow emergency workers from interstate to assist with emergency management here in the territory.
The bill also provides clarification on the types of directions that can be issued by the Chief Veterinary Officer in relation to the control of the spread of exotic or endemic diseases. Under the Animal Diseases Act, these powers are broad, and the most important powers are explicitly set out, but there is a catch-all power as well contained in section 14(1)(d). The review after the equine influenza outbreak identified that an explicit direction relating to the prevention of possible contamination or infection was not included in the act. As a result, had such a direction been required—fortunately it was not—it would have been necessary to rely on the broad, catch-all power to justify such a direction.
Preventing contamination or infection is just as important as the decontamination process itself. It is of little use to quell the spread of disease if you do not have the ability to prevent the contamination from occurring in the first place. Such an example of a possible direction to prevent a disease spreading might be to require a farmer to move their animals away from any farm’s boundaries or to temporarily keep animals stabled. The bill makes clear that directions can now be given to people to not only decontaminate their premises, products or things in relation to exotic or endemic disease but also to prevent them from contaminating or infecting anything else. I am sure members will see this as sensible and practical.
I want to reiterate that the power to issue such a direction during the equine influenza quarantine could have been based on the catch-all power in section 14(1)(d). However,
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