Page 318 - Week 01 - Thursday, 11 December 2008
Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . . PDF . . . .
I think that we are well served in that regard. On the point of judicial appointments, though, I think there is scope for us to be more open. We believe that the executive should still have the ability to make judicial appointments. I do not favour that being outsourced to a commission-style arrangement. Outgoing Justice Michael Kirby made some comments in the last day or so in relation to that point and supported the principle that the executive should appoint the judiciary.
We do believe—and we led a debate on this during the year—that there can be more openness in the way that is done. We suggested moving that to, for instance, the Standing Committee on Legal Affairs, and for the legal affairs committee to look at proposed judicial appointments. That would shed some light on the process. That would make it more transparent but it would ultimately still leave the executive to make the final decision on judicial appointments.
The Latimer House principles talk about funding of the judiciary. Of course, we can look at the broad concept that, in order for the judiciary to do its job, it needs to be supported by agencies such as the DPP. We have seen the inadequate funding of the DPP, which has led to some negative headlines in recent times. That is obviously a concern, and, in relation to these principles, if we do not properly fund the DPP then we may not be able to have as well functioning a judiciary as possible; therefore, as well functioning a legal system. That is something that will be a challenge for this government moving forward, particularly in endorsing these principles.
Independence of parliamentarians is another key part of the principles. It must be noted—and I have made this point to Greens members privately—that we do see through our standing orders some concern about freedom of speech in this place. The principle that I refer to in particular is the sub judice principle and how that is applied. We saw in the Assembly the absurd situation during the last term where Dr Foskey was debating the SLAPP legislation and, through the standing orders, was prevented from talking about the case that led to some of the SLAPP legislation being mooted because there was ongoing litigation in Tasmania.
It does seem extraordinary to me that, in the ACT Assembly, the place where freedom of speech should reach its pinnacle in the ACT community, members of parliament would be restricted in speaking about a principle like that simply because there is some litigation going on in Tasmania. I think that is an absurdity.
Mr Corbell: On a point of order, Mr Speaker, I think Mr Seselja is reflecting on a ruling of the chair. I know that you were not the chair at the time—
MR SESELJA: I’m not.
Mr Corbell: He is suggesting that the ruling by the chair was absurd and I think that is disorderly—
MR SESELJA: No.
Mr Corbell: even though it is a ruling from a previous Assembly but it is disorderly. The ruling was made by the chair, by the Speaker at the time.
Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . . PDF . . . .