Page 1149 - Week 04 - Tuesday, 8 April 2008

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However, part 5A of the bill as it currently stands is not intended to protect against risks posed by or as a result of gene technology but rather to bypass the regulatory process and to approve GMOs in cases where the minister is satisfied that there is an imminent threat.

Here we have another problem, which is that the term “threat” is not clearly defined or constrained. Bob Phelps of Gene Ethics, in his submission to the Senate committee, was concerned that:

For example, ‘threat’ includes ‘pests and diseases’ but there is no requirement that the threat be of a particular imminence, severity or scale. The word ‘threat’ is not explicitly defined yet the Bill proposes that the Minister merely be satisfied that a ‘threat’ is imminent without requirements or procedures to prove that a ‘threat’ of the sort envisaged really exists.

He was also concerned that the minister’s proposed discretion to make an emergency determination was broader than that envisaged or agreed to under the review of the act. However, the bill that was passed federally allows the minister, through his or her use of emergency powers, not only to approve the use of a GMO in relation to a medical emergency, say a vaccine or other drug, but also to override state moratoria on cultivating genetically modified crops. This is a huge concern and one which I believe goes beyond what should be allowed within the provision of emergency dealings. Arguing for a narrow potential for application of the powers, Gene Ethics submitted that:

The Act should be clear that any real threat, of a specified scale, scope and severity to justify the use of the emergency powers, is reviewed and confirmed by all jurisdictions and that the circumstances are so exceptional as to justify an emergency response to avert widespread impacts on human health or the environment.

The broad potential application also allows for the potential release of GMOs without that material having undergone a full risk assessment. There is a serious concern that the current checks and balances could be skipped if an emergency is declared. Before I could agree to this bill, I would need to be assured that all relevant checks and balances are still fully included in the approvals process, even if the timing has been expedited.

For the safety of people and the environment in the ACT and in general in Australia, we need scientific risk assessments to ensure that the introduction of any and all novel organisms is orderly and trouble free, including GMOs. Relying on the advice of a couple of prescribed persons in determining whether a substantial emergency exists does not seem like a precautionary or a sensible measure in lieu of a full safety assessment. Instead of only consulting with a few experts like the Chief Medical Officer and/or the Chief Veterinary Officer, there should also need to be approval by all the states and territories.

I understand that the intent of this bill is to limit the emergency provisions to the absolute minimum. However, I am always wary of processes that leave such decisions


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