Page 20 - Week 01 - Wednesday, 28 February 2007
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referring to the declaration of a state of emergency as “essentially an administrative measure” and telling people who were obviously in danger not to be unduly anxious or alarmed.
Despite what the Chief Minister might say, the coroner listened to those tapes, too. She heard the evidence. She made a finding. Despite what the Chief Minister might say or feel about it, it is a fact. In failing to warn the population, it seems that Mr Stanhope fell into the same trap and mindset as others who appear to have willed themselves to believe that the fire was not as serious as other people were telling them and that, in fact, it could be stopped in the grasslands.
Having heard the evidence, Coroner Doogan summarised the events of those last crucial days by saying that there was recognition on the morning of 18 January that there was potential for the fires to hit the suburbs that afternoon or evening, but that no warnings were given. She found that there was a deliberate holding back of information and a desire not to alarm the community. She found that there was no contingency plan. She found that predictions as to the timing of the impact of the fires on the suburbs were not acted on. She found that Jon Stanhope was the relevant minister at the most crucial time of the firestorm. She found that at the cabinet meeting on 16 January the Chief Minister knew there was a potential disaster, but did nothing to warn the community.
The coroner found that there were inadequate lines of control, operational protocols, communications systems and interagency liaison. She found that the declaration of a state of emergency and the public warnings were given far too late and that this placed people in even greater danger. She found that as late as 3.00 pm that day, on ABC radio, the Chief Minister tried to downplay the seriousness of the situation, even as houses in Duffy began burning. The coroner also noted that the community should have been told at first light on 18 January that some impact was a certainty. She said:
Information in clear, precise and authoritative terms should have been delivered about the predictions that had been made the previous afternoon, identifying specific areas along the rural-urban interface and the forecast time of the predicted impact.
She then listed what the people should have been told. She concluded her list of what people should have been told with probably the most profound comment of all, saying:
Apart from a late notice about some indoor and outdoor preparations, the people were told nothing.
Chief Minister, why weren’t we warned? What an indictment. What a tragic failure of leadership.
Mr Speaker, I turn now to the question of ministerial responsibility. Under the terms of ministerial responsibility as expressed in House of Representatives Practice:
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