Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . .
Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2003 Week 11 Hansard (22 October) . . Page.. 3907 ..
MR STEFANIAK (continuing):
Unless we accept that a non-government majority in the Senate represents, in the absence of a double dissolution, a permanent veto on the legislative agenda of the government of the day, then we must pursue reform to section 57.
He states that over the last century section 57 has been invoked only six times and a resultant joint sitting held only once. That indicates that section 57 is not a very workable means of resolving deadlocks. He goes on to stress a need for constitutional reform just to rebalance the relationship between the two houses and to ensure that, where they are deadlocked, the parliament as a whole may reconcile the difference as expeditiously as possible. Quite frankly, I cannot see a huge problem with that. He goes on to say:
Without such reform, governments will be unable to implement policies which have both a popular mandate and are essential to promoting good government.
He went on to talk about two options. The first option would allow the Prime Minister to ask the Governor-General to convene a joint sitting of both houses to consider a bill that has been blocked by the Senate twice during the life of the parliament, with the required three-month interval. If that bill were passed by an absolute majority, it would receive royal assent and become law. That would remove the requirement for a double dissolution election, as is currently the case under section 57.
The second option would allow the Prime Minister to ask the Governor-General to convene a joint sitting following an election to consider a bill that has been blocked by the Senate twice in the previous parliament and is blocked again in the new parliament. If the bill were passed by an absolute majority at that sitting, it would get royal assent and become law. Depending on the time the deadlock arose, the election could be either for the House of Representatives only or for the House of Representatives and half of the Senate. That option would remove the requirement to dissolve both houses, as is currently the case, but would require a House of Representatives election to break the deadlock.
The Prime Minister went on to say:
Until such time as there is a more workable and efficient means of resolving deadlocks, the effectiveness of Australian governments will be impaired.
Perhaps more significantly, the will of the electorate will remain subject to a veto for which there is no practical resolution.
The solution must be to develop a model which more faithfully reflects the will of the people and the intentions of those who drafted the Constitution.
It is a proposal therefore deserving of careful consideration and a constructive public debate.
There seem to be two options there. No doubt, if other options or modifications came up, they would be considered. Since 1983 there have been instances of a small minority coming up with an idea and, just for some immediate political gain, the major party in opposition or government in the Senate has backed it. Both major parties probably have been guilty of that. I do not know whether that is particularly good government.
Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . .