Page 1836 - Week 07 - Wednesday, 22 August 2007

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(c) those reviews concluded that FireLink was unsuitable for the ESA’s ongoing operations; and

(d) the ACT Government has provided the ESA with substantial funding to address communications issues following the 2003 bushfires which has provided emergency services personnel with advancements with the trunk radio network and computer aided dispatch system.”.

I welcome Mr Pratt’s motion; it gives me the opportunity to put on the record the government’s disappointment and frustration with how this project has run its course.

The first thing I want to say very clearly is that, throughout the period that FireLink was operational, the government consistently received advice from the then Emergency Services Authority—in the later days, from the Emergency Services Agency, as late as late last year—that FireLink was operational, that it was performing according to its requirements and that it was delivering the services the Emergency Services Authority or agency expected of it. That advice to government was not correct. Ministers were not properly informed as to the performance and status of the FireLink project. It is a singular failure, on the part of the Emergency Services Authority in the main, that it failed to advise me and my predecessors of the problems with FireLink, of the widespread concern about the implementation of FireLink and of its failure to implement an appropriate mobile data system for the ACT’s emergency services.

As I have previously said, this is not a commentary on the FireLink technology per se. FireLink was designed for particular applications in the defence environment and was then adapted for use in a civilian emergency services environment. The failure is not on the part of the technology provider, ATI. The failure was on the part of the ESA—the failure to properly scope and understand its requirements before proceeding to tender and procurement of this technology.

Shortly after I became minister, the now Emergency Services Agency commissioned two independent investigations into all of the agency’s ICT programs. That review concluded, amongst other things, that the FireLink technology was completely unsuited to the ESA’s needs. Further, it concluded that the ESA, as a statutory authority, had failed to properly scope its requirements prior to proceeding to tender, failed to properly consult with the various emergency services that would be responsible for the use of this technology from day to day and failed to properly implement that technology once it had been acquired. It was a singular failure on the part of senior management within the then Emergency Services Authority.

Quite frankly, this is a key example that underpins this government’s determination to bring a greater level of accountability and management responsibility to our emergency services, and it is the reason why we chose to re-establish the ESA as an agency within the justice portfolio. The statutory authority proved itself to not be accountable to government on key issues around project procurement, management and finance expenditure. That is the bottom line. It gives me no joy to say it, but those are the circumstances that we are now addressing—and, I am pleased to say, addressing effectively and appropriately.


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