Page 2319 - Week 07 - Thursday, 17 August 2006
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to privacy must be balanced against the right of a party to a civil or criminal proceeding to access relevant information. The limitations imposed ensure that the protected information must be for a proceeding relating to the administration or execution of a tax law. Information will still be available to all parties involved in other matters not related to tax laws through the subpoena process, thus ensuring the right to a fair trial.
Secondary disclosure may be made through the discovery and inspection processes in civil and criminal proceedings and through the special disclosure obligations of the Director of Public Prosecutions in criminal proceedings. The government believes, in the context of these avenues of access, through subpoenas, through disclosure, through discovery and through the special disclosure obligation of the Director of Public Prosecutions, that the concerns that Dr Foskey has expressed in her remarks are met. Accordingly, the committee has left it to the Assembly to consider whether the ability of a party to adduce relevant evidence at a trial to prove their case or disprove their opponent’s case should be restricted.
There are other secrecy provisions in the Taxation Administration Act that are not impacted by this bill. They allow for protected information to be disclosed for other proceedings if it does not contain personal information or if it is with the taxpayer’s consent or in accordance with a statutory requirement or the commissioner of police for a criminal investigation. As far as possible, the existing disclosures are, and will continue to be, exercised consistent with the Human Rights Act.
The committee identified a second issue in the scrutiny report. This was an alleged inconsistency between proposed section 99 of the Taxation Administration Act and the commonwealth Evidence Act. The committee’s comment was based upon the decision by the master in Pappas v Noble. I have been advised that the master appears to have been unaware of section 8 (4) of the commonwealth Evidence Act, which preserves the operation of otherwise inconsistent ACT evidence laws. As a result, the master had regard only to section 56 of the commonwealth Evidence Act, which states:
Except as otherwise provided by this act, evidence that is relevant to proceedings is admissible in the proceedings.
The ACT government therefore respectfully believes that the master erroneously concluded that any territory act that makes any of these classes of evidence inadmissible or even simply imposes barriers to the admission of the evidence is inconsistent with the commonwealth act and therefore fails. The decision in Pappas v Noble is generally considered by the profession, and is specifically considered by the ACT government, to be wrong in law. As a result of accepting Pappas v Noble as authoritative, the committee’s conclusion with regard to proposed section 99 of the Taxation Administration Act is, in the government’s view, respectfully, in error.
This bill provides equity for self-managed superannuation fund beneficiaries, clarity to payroll taxpayers in relation to what constitutes wages, greater protection of taxpayer information and increased certainty for tax officers administering the secrecy provisions applying to tax law. I thank members for their contribution and commend the bill to the Assembly.
Question resolved in the affirmative.
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