Page 1413 - Week 05 - Tuesday, 9 May 2006

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little parts which he thinks suit his argument. I might remind him that, in talking about displacement of the rules of evidence, in relation to my bill at page 66 he is specifically referring to clause 20 (2) which reads:

The Supreme Court may take into account any evidence or information that the court considers credible or trustworthy in the circumstances and, in that regard, is not bound by principles or rules governing the admission of evidence.

On page 67 the report goes on to say that such provisions are common, and are often thought to be an antidote to legalism in court proceedings. They do, however, raise issues in relation to the parties to the proceedings and in relation to a fair trial, but they are common. For example, in coronial proceedings, courts are not bound by the normal rules of evidence. You know all about that, Mr Stanhope, surely. There are other areas too where that does not apply. We are dealing with an extraordinary situation here. I do not think your bill is particularly extraordinary, because it is a lot weaker than the other bills around the country, but it is an extraordinary situation. In describing these types of laws, they are not particularly ordinary.

We are not facing an ordinary threat either. Throughout Australian history there have been acts of parliament made for extraordinary situations, especially in times of war and in times of national emergency. There have been times in Australia where in certain areas martial law has been declared. I think that, after Cyclone Tracy, Darwin had that initially, where Major-General Stretton, now recently retired and a very well-respected local practitioner, did such a wonderful job. Extraordinary times often lead to different and somewhat extraordinary laws.

You might be misguided, Mr Stanhope; you might be going completely overboard on one side in relation to this but no-one can accuse you of not respecting the normal rule of law in this country. It is because of the good sense and the respect, I think, for the rule of law of the Australian parliament and the other states and territories that what we are talking about—because there are some pretty nasty people who might be the subject of these orders—is simpler: at the end of the day, to deprive them of their liberty for the greater good of us all, the protection of our society, the protection of innocent men, women and children—to detain them for no more than 14 days in humane confinement.

There is a lot of argy-bargy going on here today in relation to this but, at the end of the day, it is as simple as that: no more than 14 days. In civilised societies, people can draw the line. Tony Blair, I think, tried to make his 90 days, or tried to extend it from 90 days. He was defeated, not only by the conservatives but also by people in his own party, because they felt that that was going a bit too far—and I agree with them. I would also agree with COAG, as does the opposition, about detaining people in these extraordinary times, with these acts—and we have not seen quite like what is envisaged here before in Australia—for no more than 14 days in humane detention, with a number of checks and safeguards.

There are checks and safeguards in your legislation. Maybe you are going overboard, but they are there and there are checks and safeguards in my bill and in the legislation of every other state and territory in the commonwealth of Australia. Because this is extraordinary, you have provisions such as clause 20 (2) of my bill. I make that point.


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