Page 3186 - Week 10 - Wednesday, 24 August 2005
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under the commonwealth government, is well within the bounds of what happens elsewhere. The system in place in the ACT today is the system that was in place when Bill Stefaniak was the Attorney-General. The Chief Justice’s remarks referred to in the decision of the Supreme Court deal with the issue of how funds can be committed and expended in the ACT. They are expended today in the same way they were expended when both Bill Stefaniak and Gary Humphries were Attorney-General of the ACT.
The extract was not about the decision to take action in relation to the coronial enquiry. It had nothing to do with it, although the full bench of the court did acknowledge that that was a difficult call. Constitutionally, funds can only be spent according to lawful appropriation. The process is not something we have dreamed up overnight. We remain consistent with the approach pursued by Gary Humphries and Bill Stefaniak. Appropriations for the purpose of funding the courts have always been made this way in the ACT, under this government, under every past ACT government and the commonwealth government before that. In this respect the ACT system is not unusual. Similar processes exist, as I said before, in every other state and territory in the commonwealth, with the exception of South Australia, where there is a different model.
The specific issue raised before the Supreme Court concerned who engaged the fire experts and under what terms they were engaged. An affidavit was placed before the Supreme Court establishing that the coroner and her counsel assisting chose the two experts, Mr Chaney and Mr Roach. The affidavit states that the coroner and counsel assisting gave instructions to the court administrator in relation to the experts they required and were fully aware of the processes used, which involved compliance with procurement procedures. I table that affidavit. It gives the detail of the process employed in the engagement of the experts. At no stage, ever, did the coroner, counsel assisting or any other party raise, as an issue of concern, the procurement process or the fact that the ACT was the formally contracted entity.
A related issue involving the formal appointment of experts under section 59 of the Coroners Act was raised in the bias proceedings in the Supreme Court, but this was a quite separate issue of compliance with the statute and was irrelevant to the question of the administrative arrangements that would underpin the statutory appointment. The judgement, as distinct from short newspaper reports of it, dated 15 August clearly acknowledges this. It states:
We accept that there is nothing in the section to prevent funding being made available by means of collateral contracts between experts appointed under s 59 and/or their employers and the ACT Government, but the section does seem to require that the appointment be made by the coroner personally.
The coroner chose Mr Chaney and approved Mr Roach’s appointment. The full contracts of engagement show that the coroner wanted the expert engaged to do certain things that are set out in the contract. The expert was to report to the coroner. No matter in the report of the experts was to be released at any stage without the consent of the coroner.
The contract reads, “In accordance with the direction of the coroner or counsel assisting the coroner, the expert,” will do a number of things. I table the contracts with the experts. The contracts are also on the government BASIS website. Anyone can look at those
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