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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2004 Week 09 Hansard (Wednesday, 18 August 2004) . . Page.. 3877 ..

domination, but for humanity”, I note that politicians are not individually singled out for special responsibilities. There is a confusion of sometimes conflicting responsibilities, but there is not provision for setting out how to deal with them. By invoking the authority of the Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities, Mr Stefaniak is giving false authority to this charter, which changes and expands the responsibilities set out in the declaration and even creates completely new responsibilities.

An important example of subtle but substantial change to a declaration of responsibility is clause 2 of the charter. It is supposed to complement the Human Rights Act but provides a very different provision from the Human Rights Act. Section 9 of the Human Rights Act says that every person from the time of birth has the right to life and that no person may be arbitrarily deprived of life. The charter is must broader than that. It is proposed that everyone should respect life and that “no-one has the right to kill or injure except in self-defence”.

As the charter is intended to prevail over the Human Rights Act, this raises the possibility, as it is intended to do, of re-opening the abortion debate. It does not specify what kind of life is to be respected or set any timeframe for when life exists. The clause does not specify that it applies to human life. Animals, vegetables—there is no end. This clause is so vague as to be virtually meaningless, and yet it can be used in ways that are socially divisive and potentially oppressive.

Whilst I do not think any of us object to the idea of establishing a code of good behaviour for all people to follow, codes of good behaviour should be appropriate to the circumstances to which they apply. I believe that this bill sets out a list of many vague, general and selective responsibilities which are intended to have legal effect that would allow them to take precedence over fundamental human rights set out in the Human Rights Act. It is inappropriate through its moral imperatives and confusing generalities. It is open to abuse through its vagueness and selectivity and it is potentially harmful in its legislative paternalism.

MS DUNDAS (4.29): The ACT Democrats cannot support the Charter of Responsibilities Bill 2004. This bill is one of the most ludicrous pieces of legislation that I have ever seen. I think it is apparent that the only reason we are debating this bill today is that Mr Stefaniak wants to make a political point about the Human Rights Act—that is that we should be legislating for individual responsibilities, not individual rights. However, as this bill clearly demonstrates, there are inherent difficulties in legislating for individual responsibility. This bill proposes that we legislate for people to have respect, for people to have ethical standards and for them to love each other. There does not seem to be the realisation that there are some things we cannot legislate for. We cannot force people, by the weight of the law, to trust, respect and love one another. We are not thought police.

I would also take issue with the idea that the Human Rights Act does not contain any responsibilities. It certainly contains many responsibilities for the government, for the judiciary and for this Assembly in how they make and interpret laws. It also encourages a general responsibility to uphold human rights in order to create a free and fair society. However, it does not go so far as to try to stipulate how people should think—unlike the bill before us today, which tries to set out people’s attitudes and feelings towards each other.

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