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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2001 Week 10 Hansard (30 August) . . Page.. 3831 ..

MR STEFANIAK (continuing):

The current legislation provides no restriction on the period of time for which an interim order may be extended. In the Supreme Court case that prompted the Government to include a time restriction on interim orders in the Bill, the interim restraining order was in force for 21 months.

In the context of the maximum period of 12 months for a final restraining order, this is unacceptable.

This case clearly demonstrated the discrepancy in the current legislation that allows an interim restraining order to continue in force for a period of time that is longer than the period of time for which a final restraining order may be made.

From the policy perspective, is undesirable that interim orders, which are made without the need to have regard to the same rigorous considerations as final orders, should continue in force for an extended period of time without being properly tested.

There are significant issues with imposing restrictions on a respondent's liberty, without any consideration of the impact of those restrictions.

For this reason the Bill includes an overall maximum time limit for an interim order of 16 weeks. The Bill also provides that any one extension of an interim order may not be for more than 8 weeks. Where an interim order is consented to, however, the parties may consent to an order of up to 16 weeks without any review within that timeframe.

The time limits on an interim restraining order in the Bill are intended to ensure that matters do not carry on indefinitely without adequate review, whilst also being cognisant of the burden that unnecessary review would have on the parties and the resources of the court.

Legislation of this type is intended to provide a quick, effective means of seeking protection from violence. Having interim orders continuing in force for excessive periods of time is not consistent with the quick resolution of matters.

Both applicants and respondents will benefit from an early resolution to proceedings.

In addition, clause 59 of the Bill allows a further interim order to be made but only where there are special or exceptional circumstances that justify the making of the further interim order.

Government Amendment 6 amends clause 59 in response to concerns raised in discussion with community stakeholders to clarify that "special or exceptional circumstances" is to be determined having regard to the principles of the Act.

Application provisions-Government Amendment 2

Under the Protection Orders Bill, the distinction between the applicant and the aggrieved person has been removed.

This was quite deliberate as the existing situation is extremely confusing. For example, it is not apparent whether an applicant who is separate from the aggrieved person is required to act in the best interests of the aggrieved person.

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