Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . .

Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2001 Week 10 Hansard (30 August) . . Page.. 3826 ..


MR STEFANIAK (continuing):

that the review should simplify the current legislation in addition to fixing the technical defects. The Protection Orders Bill thus consolidates the protection order provisions of the Domestic Violence Act of 1986 and the restraining order provisions in part 10 of the Magistrates Court Act of 1930, and provides a single consistent process for dealing with both restraining orders and protection orders.

The bill addresses the issues identified by the Supreme Court. In particular, the bill clarifies the role of the Registrar in proceedings by providing a clear statement of the power of the Registrar to conduct a preliminary conference, make a consent order, and adjourn proceedings in specific circumstances. In response to the Supreme Court decisions, the bill also clarifies a requirement for a "likelihood of repetition" for a personal protection order. The bill includes a clear statement of objects and principles. The statement of principles in the bill is an articulation of the balancing of rights that is undertaken by the court in making a protection order. The protection of the aggrieved person is the paramount consideration. Within this framework, however, any protection order should be the least restrictive of the personal rights and liberties of the respondent, while still giving effect to the paramount consideration.

I will deal with workplace orders now because I think Mr Stanhope mentioned them. I would like to say a few words about the workplace orders provision in the Protection Orders Bill. The bill takes a slightly different approach to the current provisions of the Magistrates Court Act. I think that is where Mr Stanhope said this is a bit different. The Magistrates Court Act focuses on individual employees as the aggrieved person, with the employer able to make an application on behalf of that employee. Under the provisions of the bill, the focus is on the workplace rather than the individual employees, and the employer becoming the aggrieved person for the purpose of making an application. This reflects the purpose of Mr Berry's Magistrates Court Amendment Bill of 2000. Mr Berry outlined the basic reasons for allowing an employer to make an application on behalf of an employee in his presentation speech, and I will quote from page 1338 of Hansard of 10 May 2000. He said this:

I take the view that no worker need take home the problems that are created in their workplace and there ought to be a straightforward protection for the most part to deal with those sorts of issues. ... In considering the implications of the provision for teachers I became aware that there were, as I said earlier, other employees who could become an aggrieved person because of their work.

The emphasis is on employees needing protection because of their work. This is the relevant connection that is the basis of the workplace order provisions and hence, under the Protection Orders Bill, the focus is on the workplace rather than the individual employees, with the employer becoming the aggrieved person for the purposes of making an application. Members may recall the earlier debate on Mr Berry's bill which included considerable debate on whether the details of the person making the complaint could be protected. By making the employer the aggrieved person, the Protection Orders Bill avoids this difficulty.

I come now to consultation. It has been suggested that debate on this bill should be delayed. Now the Labor Party want to knock it off totally so that it could be more widely considered in parts of the community. Mr Speaker, it would have been very difficult to consult widely on this legislation prior to its preparation because of the fact that it is extremely technical in nature. Again I emphasise that it is a technical rewrite. It does not


Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . .