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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 1997 Week 10 Hansard (24 September) . . Page.. 3183 ..


MR MOORE (continuing):

Although this community, this Assembly and the parliament in the Northern Territory considered it appropriate that such decisions remain the prerogative of the Territories, the Federal Parliament was prepared to override the rights of the Territory Assemblies to make such decisions.

The Federal legislation not only prevented this Assembly from making it legal for a medical practitioner to assist somebody who was dying and in great pain, but also cast a shadow over the Medical Treatment Act 1994, which contains our law regarding passive euthanasia, in the form of the right to refuse life support treatment. In spite of requests to the Federal Government, the Prime Minister, in a letter to Mrs Carnell, has refused to help resolve these doubts. However, what the Federal legislation has done is give us time to stop and think what is the best way for us to deal with voluntary active euthanasia. It is quite clear from a wide range of polling that a huge majority of people within the ACT and within the Australian community believe that, where somebody is suffering great pain and distress and is given the opportunity for assistance by a medical practitioner under strictly regulated circumstances, that decision should not mean a long gaol sentence for the doctor. The great majority in our community believe that the decision of the dying person who is in great pain should be respected.

Not only is this position reflected in polling, but it has also become clearer and clearer through common law. Not only are directors of public prosecutions determining - in the public interest, which is, of course, their prerogative - not to launch prosecutions for people who have assisted in this way; but, indeed, when the rare cases do come before a court, they are being dismissed by the jury. Why is this the case? This is the case because, at the moment, the common law is a very blunt instrument that says that either somebody is guilty of assisting suicide or they are not, and the penalty for assisting suicide, in the most extreme, is a 10-year penalty. In the current legislation, there is no clear degree of difference between one form of assisted suicide and another. This situation does not reflect community values, and accordingly it deserves to be reformed.

The legislation I present today sets out different penalties for offences in different circumstances and, as such, it sets out a broader picture of community values. This legislation would not permit, nor is it intended to permit, voluntary active euthanasia. That outcome would be inconsistent with the Commonwealth legislation - the Euthanasia Laws Act 1997. What this legislation does do is provide, as closely as possible, for the application of community values to various possible circumstances where assisted suicide occurs. Underlying these altered penalties is the fact that the offence currently in subsection 17(1) of the Crimes Act remains in force. Only in specifically described circumstances will an equivalent offence with reduced penalties apply.

It should also be noted that subsection 17(2) of the Crimes Act - the offence of inciting or counselling another person to commit suicide - will be unaffected by this Bill. This offence has a penalty of 10 years' imprisonment. The existing Crimes Act offence would still apply, for example, to somebody who comes upon a depressed stranger who says, "I want to die", and the reply is, "Let me give you a hand. I have a rusty razor blade or a Swiss Army knife and I am happy to assist you on your way". Such conduct is clearly abhorrent. It is abhorrent to me, I presume that it is to the community at large,


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