Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . .

Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 1995 Week 9 Hansard (22 November) . . Page.. 2266 ..

MR HUMPHRIES (continuing):

[The prohibition on intentional killing] protects each one of us impartially, embodying the belief that all are equal. We do not wish that protection to be diminished and we therefore recommend that there should be no change to the law to permit euthanasia. We acknowledge that there are individual cases in which euthanasia may be seen by some to be appropriate. But individual cases cannot reasonably establish the foundation of a policy which would have such serious and widespread repercussions.

Moreover, dying is not only a personal or individual affair. The death of a person affects the lives of others, often in ways and to an extent which cannot be foreseen. We believe that the issue of euthanasia is one in which the interest of the individual cannot be separated from the interests of society as a whole.

The committee went on to conclude that it is not possible to set secure limits on voluntary euthanasia. Again, I quote:

It would be next to impossible to ensure that all acts of euthanasia were truly voluntary, and that any liberalisation of the law was not abused. Moreover to create an exception to the general prohibition of intentional killing would inevitably open the way to test the limits of any regulation.

I believe that the practice in Holland has underscored the truth of that statement. As I have said, I cannot support in conscience the proposal by Mr Moore, regardless of what assurances the legislation he puts forward might offer.

I would urge other members to consider, irrespective of their personal views, the potential dangers of opening up the possibility of voluntary euthanasia and what they would mean for society's perception about the value of human life. I do not think it is overstating the case to suggest that the questioning of the value of human life, which is an inherent element of the arguments in favour of euthanasia, could see us start to ask whether euthanasia could apply not just to dying persons. Mr Connolly has already raised the question of how and where we draw that line. Might we not find it applied simply to people whose quality of life has been compromised by other circumstances, be it a handicap of some kind, infirmity, or great age? If we take the view that those whose lives are meaningless or of poor quality are better off dead, or might be considered by some in perhaps parlous circumstances to be better off dead, how long would it be before voluntary euthanasia might become involuntary euthanasia?

These issues should not be dismissed as hypothesising. There is some evidence already quoted in this place that there is such a crossing of the line in Holland. It is salutary to remember that the last time the notion of some lives not being worthy to be lived was accepted and promulgated on a large scale was in Nazi Germany and ultimately that led to the attempted extermination of entire races. I mention this as an illustration of how

Next page . . . . Previous page . . . . Speeches . . . . Contents . . . . Debates(HTML) . . . .