Page 3523 - Week 12 - Wednesday, 12 October 1994
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When we put this clause into the Bill, we knew that there was the difficulty of the doctrine of double effect. Our committee spent a great deal of time dealing with a whole range of people on that issue of the doctrine of double effect. In fact, Mrs Carnell asked question after question. In the last sitting of the Assembly she actually read from the transcript in order to explain the position that the Catholic Bishop of Canberra, Pat Power, had taken on this issue and to explain where it was acceptable and where it was not acceptable in terms of intent. The intent here is quite clearly relief of pain; it is not death. That is why it is a part of passive euthanasia. If indeed somebody did die - and I suggest to you that it would be a very rare occasion - according to Bishop Power's words, as quoted from the transcript, it would indeed be passive euthanasia.
MR HUMPHRIES (12.19): Madam Speaker, I want to indicate that I will not be supporting the amendment moved by Mr Stevenson. Having read Mr Francis's opinion, as others in this debate have, I must say that I think it is quite true that this legislation modifies possibly the law relating to homicide and certainly that relating to suicide. At least it appears to do so. It is clear that a person who declines to receive medical treatment may, in certain circumstances, be causing their own death. It would seem to me to be a form of suicide if by saying, "I do not wish to receive this blood transfusion or have this operation or receive this life saving drug" a person necessarily brings about their own death. That is the common law as it stands at the moment. It is, as Mr Connolly indicated, quite possible for any person to decline treatment and, by doing so, cause their own death. Indeed, suicide and attempted suicide are not illegal. I certainly view them as morally wrong; but I do not think it is appropriate to build into the law of the Territory what is not there now, which is a provision making it illegal to commit suicide. It follows that it should equally be not legal for a doctor, following the clear, carefully guarded instructions of a patient, to withhold treatment which might bring about that patient's death. That is both the common law and, I would submit, a rational position to take.
The extent to which this legislation makes it clear that ordinary law relating to suicide does not affect this legislation is necessarily part of this legislation's operation. Section 18 of the Crimes Act makes it clear that a person may act to prevent the suicide of another person. If we were to accept that a person is entitled to refuse treatment, as they are now, and thereby bring about their own death and that a doctor is entitled to accept an instruction of a patient and thereby abet that process, it would be ridiculous for a third person to be able to come in and say, "No, I am stopping a person committing suicide; I am going to push the tube back in or force the pill down the patient's throat". That clearly does not make sense. To that extent we are setting aside certain sections of the Crimes Act, but only in relation to the instructions that a patient gives to his or her doctor and only to the extent that the Medical Treatment Bill covers those circumstances.
I accept absolutely that this is not a Bill about active euthanasia. Although I have sympathy for the idea of preserving those elements of the Crimes Act which clearly ought, as a matter of public policy, to remain in place - for example, the provisions about inciting somebody to commit suicide and so on I - do not think that this Bill actually touches on that question. Therefore, to legislate to somehow preserve those particular aspects of those sections would be unnecessary in the framework of this legislation.
Amendment negatived, Mr Stevenson dissenting.
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