Page 3211 - Week 11 - Wednesday, 21 September 1994
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I suppose that it could be argued that maximum pain relief is death and that this law would justify a lethal injection or an injection of material that would kill a person or perhaps the unborn child that the person was carrying. That is not the intention of this legislation. I do not think that would be a reasonable interpretation anyway, given the legislative background to this Bill, given what is in the committee report and given the general comments that have been made in the in-principle stage. But, in order to make it abundantly clear that this is not a Bill that authorises active euthanasia, the Government seeks to include this provision.
No doubt opponents will say, "But what is reasonable?". The current law is totally vague. Here we have a provision which qualifies it, with the explanations that have been offered both now and in the in-principle stage. I would remind members of what I said in the in-principle stage, which was that we know and we expect that this will cover pain relief which will ease the suffering of a person with an extreme incurable condition and we know that that may be pain relief that incidentally has the effect of hastening the inevitable point of death. That is one thing. Accepting the litre of morphine, which will have instant consequences, is another. What we are saying is reasonable is pain relief which may have an incidental effect. If a person is receiving massive doses of oral morphine and is receiving very little by way of ingested food, the taking of high doses of ingested morphine, which will slow down their bodily functions, may mean that they are going to die earlier than if they were in great pain and less heavily dosed. But I think that everybody accepts that that is a reasonable thing for a treating physician to provide.
What is not reasonable for a treating physician to provide is a dose that is known and intended to be lethal. That is what this amendment seeks to clarify. I think that any community groups who believe that this law could be used as a back door to active euthanasia should be satisfied that this definition or clarification where it appears later at clause 22 puts it beyond doubt. I know that Mr Moore had some reservations about this. He did not think it was necessary. But I would say that what we are doing here is seeking to put beyond doubt that the intention of this Assembly at this stage is not to be debating an active euthanasia Bill.
MR KAINE (11.43): Madam Speaker, I think that the Attorney-General's explanation of why he wishes to change this clause comes to the crux of the problem. I do not believe that his amendment to this clause makes it any clearer. In fact, if anything, it makes it less clear. At least Mr Moore made clear what he intended - that this is to ensure the right of patients to receive maximum relief from pain and suffering. How do you know when a patient has received maximum relief from pain and suffering? I presume that there is some objective measure. If there is, I do not know what it is. I am not a medical practitioner. From where I stand, I would assume that, when somebody became unconscious or went into a coma, that would be an indication that they were at the maximum point of pain and suffering; but I do not know that. Neither does the Attorney-General and neither, I suggest, does Mr Moore.
Mr Moore's intention was quite clear - that a patient would be entitled to receive any quantity of whatever was required to relieve pain and suffering, even if there were some risk that that may lead directly to the death of the patient. That is what he meant. There is no doubt in my mind about that. It was one of the clauses of this Bill that terrified me. Mr Connolly says that this is not about active euthanasia; but, when you
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