Page 989 - Week 04 - Tuesday, 19 April 1994

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Taking my first argument as read, it would be unfair to those other candidates to lose their deposits merely because party voters had done the right thing and had followed the ticket and voted 1 for Ms Follett. Of course, Mr Lamont and Mr Connolly, and perhaps others down the line, all get the benefit of a flow of preferences from Ms Follett.

Mr De Domenico: What - the reserves?

MR HUMPHRIES: The reserves, whose names we cannot mention, will get the benefit of the five preferences; but, if things go according to plan, they will get a very small primary vote. They should not, in my view, Madam Speaker, be discriminated against because they do get a small primary vote.

Surely the better test is the test applied in Tasmania, which is the test of what vote a candidate has, individually based, not party based, at the point at which the candidate is excluded from the count. If a candidate gets a very low primary vote, under Ms Follett's arrangement they would lose their deposit, particularly if they are an Independent candidate. However, if that candidate manages to get many preferences from any sources and builds up to a decent vote, that candidate is entitled, I think, quite reasonably, to the return of his or her deposit. That is only fair.

Ms Follett suggested that there was a marked difference between our two suggestions in terms of the number of votes you need to achieve. That is not so - not necessarily so, anyway. In the seven-member electorate, in the centre, 20 per cent of a quota will be about 2.5 per cent, so Ms Follett's 2 per cent of primary votes versus my 2.5 per cent of votes at the point of exclusion probably makes very little difference at all. Indeed, it might well be easier to get to 2.5 per cent on final preferences than it is to get to 2 per cent of first preferences.

Mr Kaine: The Labor B team will be interested in that.

MR HUMPHRIES: Indeed, a Labor B team will be interested in that kind of outcome. Do not worry, Mr Connolly; you are in the A team. Do not worry; that is taken care of. Madam Speaker, what the Government is proposing clearly is a grossly unfair arrangement. It is not the procedure that is followed in Tasmania. I see no reason at all, Madam Speaker, why we should not pick up the provisions as used in Tasmania. They are fair. They are workable. They have the support of the Labor Party in Tasmania. What is wrong with applying them here?

MS FOLLETT (Chief Minister and Treasurer) (9.14): Madam Speaker, one of the points which I would like to draw to members' attention is the fact that the scheme which has been proposed by the Government for the return of deposits is consistent with our scheme for public funding, and I believe that it is important that there be consistency between these two factors in the electoral legislation. After all, both factors are important in deciding how serious a candidate's bid for public office was. The very fact that we do have a threshold for return of deposit and that we do have a threshold for public funding indicates that there is a general purpose in acknowledging the seriousness of a bid.


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