Page 2271 - Week 08 - Wednesday, 4 August 2021
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Provisions of this bill will effectively displace the ability of a state or territory court or tribunal to compel the production of documents, records or information collected by the app. Information collected through Check In CBR will only be admissible as evidence in a court proceeding for the purposes of investigating or prosecuting an offence for failing to comply with a public health direction relating to contact tracing. This is similar to key components of Western Australian legislation to protect information for COVID-19 contact tracing in relation to the SafeWA app.
The amendments proposed in this bill also seek to establish new offences to safeguard the appropriate use of both the Check In CBR app and check-in information, which is information collected for contact tracing purposes about the presence of a person at a particular place at a particular time. To that end, an offence is included which would prevent persons who are defined as authorised collectors of check-in information, other than an authorised person at the ACT government, from collecting contact tracing information in a way other than through the Check In CBR app or an alternative way permitted under the public health direction or by an exemption by the Chief Health Officer. This is intended to prevent unauthorised third-party systems or persons from being used to collect check-in information. Furthermore, an offence is also included in the bill prohibiting the unauthorised use of check-in information.
The proposed offences in the bill would prohibit the collection of information for contact tracing purposes by an authorised collector other than through direct entry of information into the Check In CBR app or in a way permitted under the public health direction, including any exemption given by the Chief Health Officer; the use of check-in information by anyone other than an authorised person or an authorised collector who discloses check-in information to an authorised person in accordance with the public health direction; failing to take reasonable steps to protect check-in information that is held by an authorised collector from misuse, interference or loss, or from unauthorised access, modification or disclosure; and an authorised collector failing to take reasonable steps to destroy check-in information at the end of the contact tracing period, where it is held by the authorised collector—that is, within 28 days or another period prescribed by legislation—unless the information is required for contact tracing or to investigate a breach of the direction.
The commencement of the offence provisions within the bill will be delayed by 30 calendar days, which will provide for a grace period for government compliance and enforcement agencies to engage with businesses and undertakings, and will allow businesses to modify their operations to bring them into line with the legislation. In introducing this bill today, I acknowledge the public contributions of the Human Rights Commission seeking to ensure the protection of personal information from being obtained through compulsion by a court or tribunal.
We are confident that ACT Policing understands the vital importance of maintaining public confidence in the Check In CBR app. While we are confident in that, the government has considered the concerns expressed by the Human Rights Commission and recent developments in Western Australia. We are therefore bringing forward these legislative amendments to enhance confidence in the privacy protections of the personal information collected through the Check In CBR app. This bill will provide
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