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Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2013 Week 11 Hansard (19 September) . . Page.. 3549..


Original Non-Owner partner fee ($m) 5.5 12.7 N/A 2.4 2.5 Adjustment ($m) 0.2 1.0 N/A 0.0 0.0 Adjusted Non-Owner Partner fee ($m) 5.7 13.7 N/A 2.4 2.5 Non-Owner Partner fee paid ($m) 5.7 13.7 N/A 2.4 2.5 Residual fee ($m) 0.0 0.0 N/A 0.0 0.0 Gain share to Non-Owner Partner ($m) 0.9 13.7 N/A 0.9 2.5 Original Budgeted Cost ($m) N/A N/A 32.9 N/A N/A Final Cost ($m) N/A N/A 33.1 N/A N/A Date of commissioning/ completion 24 January 2011 7 September 2012 9 May 2012 20 January 2010 31 March 2011

Canberra Hospital—data centre (Question No 144)

Mr Hanson asked the Minister for Health, upon notice, on 15 August 2013:

For the (a) Emergency Department Information System, (b) RiskPac, (c) ICU database, (d) Clinical Record Information System medical records, (e) pharmacy system and (f) alarm system, (i) at what time did the system go offline, (ii) at what time did the system return online, (iii) did backup systems in place during the outage make the system functional, (iv) were the systems inaccessible during the outage and (v) what paper-based contingencies were in place.

Ms Gallagher: The answer to the member's question is as follows:

(i) At 10.16am on Monday 12 August 2013, the data centre at the Canberra Hospital (TCH) lost power. The data centre operates several clinical systems in TCH, including those listed.

(ii) At 12.15pm the data centre was operational and the following critical systems had been restored:

      •     Emergency Department's Information System (EDIS)

      •     RISPACS

      •     Alarm system

By 2.00pm, the following systems were operational:

      •     Intensive Care Unit (ICU) system

      •     Clinical Record Information System (CRIS) medical records

By 4.30pm all of the systems mentioned in the question were fully operational.

(iii) As soon as the outage occurred, systems with failover diverted to the secondary site. Some manual intervention was needed on systems to confirm no data was lost or corrupted and the integrity of systems and data was maintained.


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